Against the Grain
Volume 21 | Issue 1

Article 33

February 2009

Legally Speaking -- The Legality of Open Source
Part II: Jacobsen v. Katzer
Bryan M. Carson
Western Kentucky University, bryan.m.carson@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/atg
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons
Recommended Citation
Carson, Bryan M. (2009) "Legally Speaking -- The Legality of Open Source Part II: Jacobsen v. Katzer," Against the Grain: Vol. 21: Iss.
1, Article 33.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7771/2380-176X.2516

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

LEGAL ISSUES
Section Editors:

Bruce Strauch (The Citadel) <strauchb@citadel.edu>
Bryan M. Carson, J.D., M.I.L.S. (Western Kentucky University) <bryan.carson@wku.edu>
Jack Montgomery (Western Kentucky University) <jack.montgomery@wku.edu>

Legally Speaking — The Legality of Open Source
Software Part II: Jacobsen v. Katzer
by Bryan M. Carson, J.D., M.I.L.S. (Associate Professor, Coordinator of Reference and Instructional Services, Associated
Faculty — Library Media Education Program, Western Kentucky University Libraries, 1906 College Heights Blvd. #11067,
Bowling Green, Kentucky 42101-1067; Phone: 270-745-5007; Fax: 270-745-2275) <bryan.carson@wku.edu>

T

he development of the “Copyleft” and
open source movement has thrown
copyright law for a loop. There have
been some questions about the legality of open
source products, including those that use the
GNU General Public License. However, two
recent cases have affirmed the legality of the
open source movement. In part I, I discussed
the case of Wallace v. IBM,1 a 2006 case in
which the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the GNU General Public License was
not a violation of antitrust law. However, that
did not completely settle the copyright and
copyleft question. This month’s column will
discuss the 2008 case of Jacobsen
v. Katzer,2 which was (unusually)
decided by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.
Jacobsen v. Katzer sought to
determine whether a copyright
holder can have his/her cake and
eat it too. The key issue of this case
was whether authors who use the
alternative system are still covered
by copyright, or whether they have
really given up all rights to their

Something to Think About
from page 58
back seats paying attention to only their books
or games where we were full of questions as
youth. Can it be that the growing technology
in this world has stricken us with a non-communicative group of young adults? I fear that
relying on computers, ipods, and a myriad of
games has led us to a more non-reactive group
of people who will have a lot of trouble managing others and communicating a professional
passion and ethic to their patrons in whatever
venue they choose to work. I wonder if this
isn’t an area that needs our special attention?
I am trying to volunteer some hours to communicate with new professionals. How about
you? Is it worth our efforts, even at conferences, to communicate our “joie de vivre” to
others?
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work. In other words, have they inadvertently
placed their work in the public domain? In
August 2008, we received an answer to this
question from the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.

The Origins of Jacobsen v. Katzer
This case concerned software for model
train hobbyists. Robert Jacobsen is a software
designer in California. He created software
to program chips for model trains, which was
distributed under the Artistic license. Jacobsen’s license specifically indicated that future
“downstream” modifications must themselves
be subject to the same Artistic license
terms as the original. However, KAM
Industries modified the software and
began to sell it commercially
under the exclusive rights
of copyright. Because the
software involved the
programming of chips
which ran trains,
KAM also obtained
a utility patent for
the mechanical portion of their product.
Jacobsen filed
a lawsuit in Federal
court in the Northern
District of California for violation of copyright
and breach of contract. He also sought a
declaratory judgment that KAM’s patent was
invalid. In addition, the plaintiff requested
a preliminary injunction to stop KAM from
distributing their software. While agreeing
that Jacobsen had a valid claim under contract
law, the District Court ruled that the language
of the Artistic license was so broad as to be
unenforceable under copyright law. This was
a major blow for Jacobsen because of the rules
regarding preliminary injunctions.

Standards for Preliminary
Injunctions
An injunction is an equitable court order
that commands a party “to do or to abstain
from doing a particular action. The purpose
... is to preclude the occurrence of a threat-

ened wrong or injury as well as to prevent
future violations.”3 This can take the form
of a temporary restraining order (TRO), a
preliminary injunction, or a permanent injunction. A TRO is “a temporary order of
a court to keep conditions as they are (like
not taking a child out of the county or not
selling marital property) until there can be a
hearing in which both parties are present.”4
Once both parties are present, the court may
issue a preliminary injunction. After final
disposition of the case, the judge may then
order a permanent injunction.5 In intellectual
property cases, injunctions usually take the
form of prohibiting the infringing party from
continuing their infringement. Because a
preliminary injunction is issued before final
disposition, courts must weigh carefully the
costs and benefits of using this remedy. Courts
typically use the following test for whether to
issue a preliminary injunction:
(1) Whether the plaintiff will probably
succeed on the merits;
(2) Whether irreparable harm to the
plaintiff would result if the injunction
is not granted;
(3) The balance of harms between the
plaintiff and defendant if the injunction
is allowed; and
(4) Whether the injunction will have an
impact on the public interest.6
While preliminary injunctions are heavily used in intellectual property cases, they
are not appropriate for breach of contract
claims. The appropriate remedy for breaching
a contract is payment of monetary damages.
There is no presumption of irreparable harm
in contract law. Thus, the district court’s
decision precluding Jacobsen’s copyright
claim meant that he was not entitled to obtain
a preliminary injunction.

Why This Court?
One of the most unusual features of the
Jacobsen case was the court that heard the
appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was created in 1982 when Congress
merged the Court of Customs and Patent Apcontinued on page 60
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peals with the appellate division of the U.S.
Court of Claims. This nationwide appellate
court has jurisdiction over cases involving
international trade, patents, trademarks, and
appeals of some administrative agencies, as
well as claims of monetary damage against the
Federal government. However, the appellate
jurisdiction of the court is also limited to only
those specific types of cases.7 Since copyright
is not one of the areas of law that are specifically assigned to the Federal Circuit, the only
copyright cases they hear are ones which arise
under patent or trademark law. Otherwise, the
court does not have proper appellate jurisdiction and can’t hear the case.8
The only reason why the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit was able to hear the
Jacobsen case was because of his declaratory
judgment action to declare KAM’s patent invalid. As a result, the case arose under patent
law, and the Federal Circuit ruled that it had
jurisdiction to hear the case. While somewhat
controversial, the Federal Circuit’s ruling is
based on both case law and the original statute
enabling the court.9

The Ruling of the Court
As with any other type of intellectual
property, copyright may be licensed. This can
be done through exclusive or nonexclusive
licenses. When a copyright owner grants a
nonexclusive license, he or she waives the ability to sue for copyright infringement. After all,
the user is covered by a license. Under those
circumstances, it makes sense that the correct
remedy would be a contract infringement case
for breaching the agreement. But if the use is
pursuant to a license that is limited in scope,
and if the user acts outside the scope of the
license, the copyright owner can in fact sue
for copyright infringement.10 So the important
question is whether the Artistic license is a condition of the license, or merely a covenant (a
term of a contract). As mentioned above, preliminary injunctions are available for copyright
cases but not for breach of contract claims.
The court began its analysis by reviewing
the plain words of the Artistic license: “The
intent of this document is to state the conditions under which a Package may be copied.”11
(Emphasis added by court.) The opinion also
noted other ways in which the terminology
of the Artistic license is in accordance with
conditional language: “The Artistic license
also uses the traditional language of conditions by noting that the rights to copy, modify,
and distribute are granted ‘provided that’ the
conditions are met. Under California contract
law, ‘provided that’ typically denotes a condition.”12 The plain language on the face of the
document therefore appears to state conditions.
“Copyright licenses are designed to support the
right to exclude; money damages alone do not
support or enforce that right.”13 The opinion
goes on to state:
In this case, a user who downloads the
JMRI copyrighted materials is authorized to make modifications and to dis-
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tribute the materials “provided that” the
user follows the restrictive terms of the
Artistic license. A copyright holder can
grant the right to make certain modifications, yet retain his right to prevent other
modifications. Indeed, such a goal is
exactly the purpose of adding conditions
to a license grant. The Artistic license,
like many other common copyright
licenses, requires that any copies that
are distributed contain the copyright
notices and the COPYING file. ... It is
outside the scope of the Artistic license
to modify and distribute the copyrighted
materials without copyright notices and
a tracking of modifications from the
original computer files. If a downloader
does not assent to these conditions stated
in the COPYING file, he is instructed
to “make other arrangements with the
Copyright Holder.” Katzer/Kamind
did not make any such “other arrangements.”
The court therefore ruled that the Artistic
license constitutes a condition of the grant of
rights. “Copyright holders who engage in open
source licensing have the right to control the
modification and distribution of copyrighted
material.”14 This is not a mere contract term;
this language is part and parcel of the conditions for licensing use of the material.
The precedential value of this opinion is
that a creator who uses an open source license
does not give up his or her rights to the material. Katzer had argued that Jacobsen had
donated his work to the public domain when
he gave it away without charging. However,
the court agreed with Jacobsen that he had
in fact granted a conditional license, just as
any copyright holder may do. Any use that
is beyond the conditions listed in the license
(such as selling the work for profit) is outside
the scope of the granted rights. Therefore, using an open source license does not invalidate
the underlying copyright, and not abiding
by the stated terms will constitute copyright
infringement.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is an unusual place for a major copyright
decision. However, because there was a patent
claim involved, the court had proper jurisdiction to hear the case. Those who support the
copyleft and open source movement can take
heart that this strongly-worded decision. In
the first scholarly article to analyze this recent
case,15 law professor Brian Fitzgerald and his
co-author Rami Olwan sum up the situation
as follows:
This is a landmark decision because
it confirms that free and open source
software copyright licences [sic] 16
and by analogy open content licences
that are similar in style to the Artistic
licence are:
1) copyright licences;
2) which impose licence conditions which if not satisfied
can found an action in and the
grant of remedies for copyright
infringement; and
3) are legally enforceable.

This in turn provides individuals, businesses, universities and governments that
use these types of licences to distribute and
acquire code and content with a greater degree
of confidence in their legality.17
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